Parental Choices and the Prospect of Regret: An Alternative Account by Schaubroeck, Katrien & Hens, Kristien
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=riph20
Download by: [94.224.125.1] Date: 28 October 2017, At: 05:46
International Journal of Philosophical Studies
ISSN: 0967-2559 (Print) 1466-4542 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/riph20
Parental Choices and the Prospect of Regret: An
Alternative Account
Katrien Schaubroeck & Kristien Hens
To cite this article: Katrien Schaubroeck & Kristien Hens (2017) Parental Choices and the
Prospect of Regret: An Alternative Account, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 25:5,
586-607, DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2017.1381405
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1381405
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 13 Oct 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 102
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
InternatIonal Journal of PhIlosoPhIcal studIes, 2017
Vol. 25, no. 5, 586–607
https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1381405
© 2017 the author(s). Published by Informa uK limited, trading as taylor & francis Group.
this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution-noncommercial-
noderivatives license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, 
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, 
or built upon in any way.
Parental Choices and the Prospect of Regret: An 
Alternative Account
Katrien Schaubroeck and Kristien Hens
department of Philosophy, university of antwerp, antwerp, Belgium
ABSTRACT
Is the question ‘will you regret it if you do (not do) this?’ helpful when people face 
difficult life decisions, such as terminating a pregnancy if a disability is detected or 
deciding to become a parent? Despite the commonness of the question in daily 
life, several philosophers have argued lately against its usefulness. We reconstruct 
four arguments from recent literature on regret, transformative experience and the 
use of imagination in deliberation. After analysis of these arguments we conclude 
that the prospect of regret remains a useful deliberative heuristic, provided four 
conditions are fulfilled. If the prospect of (the absence of ) regret is arrived at via 
reflection on one’s values, in a non-coercive context, when well-informed about 
factual circumstances, and in a process of self-commitment, the question of what 
one will regret is a helpful device to get in touch with one’s deepest concerns that 
give reasons to act in a particular way.
KEYWORDS regret; abortion; transformative experience; imagination; r. Jay Wallace; l.a. Paul
1. Introduction
Imagine a 38-year-old woman experiencing an existential crisis, because she 
does not know whether she wants a child or not. If she postpones the decision 
much longer, nature will decide for her. A good friend listens to her doubts 
and tries to help, asking: ‘If you imagine yourself in five years, do you think it 
likely you will regret motherhood?’
Imagine another woman, already pregnant for 12 weeks, having received a 
positive result to the Non-Invasive Prenatal Test (NIPT). The foetus she car-
ries has trisomy-21: her child will be born with Down syndrome. She and her 
partner have to make a decision urgently about the pregnancy: abortion is 
legal in the country they live in, but it has to be done soon. Imagine the couple 
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discussing the options and asking themselves: ‘Will we regret the abortion, or 
rather will we regret keeping the baby?’
These imaginary dilemma-cases and the methods deployed do not seem far-
fetched. Imagining whether one will regret something is a deliberative heuristic 
that is very common. Even very small, daily decisions, like whether one should 
go and see a movie or rather grade a student’s paper, are often made on the basis 
of the prospect of regret. It is likely that there are individual differences as to how 
often one invokes this heuristic, depending, among other things, on how hard 
one finds it to make decisions. But still, it does not strike most people as a strange 
or useless tool. Yet philosophers and ethicists tend to disagree. In bio-ethics, for 
example, the role of regret is remarkably absent from theoretical reflection on 
decisions in the context of prenatal testing. Bio-ethicists have often assumed that 
decisions about whether to end a pregnancy or not are best taken using general 
principles, such as the intrinsic value of a foetus at a certain gestational age, or 
considerations about the well-being of the future child, or even the relative cost 
of raising disabled children for society. The discussion is mostly about whether 
there are consequences for the offspring, rather than about the relevant desires 
and wishes of those involved in the decision-making. Hence, the prospect of 
regret is evidently overlooked as a relevant factor to take into account. It is true 
that the principle of reproductive autonomy is often invoked, which states that it 
is up to the pregnant mother to decide whether to continue a pregnancy or not. 
But how she should decide, let alone which emotions and desires and concerns 
should inform the deliberation, is rarely discussed in bio-ethics.
Recent theories about emotions and deliberation in moral psychology do not 
so much overlook as negatively value the role of regret. The value of regret has 
been doubted and the deliberative usefulness of the prospect of regret has been 
questioned from several perspectives. In this article, we will cover four recently 
developed philosophical objections against the use of regret as a deliberative 
tool. After discussing and evaluating these objections by testing them on the two 
case studies described above, we will describe the conditions under which we 
think the prospect of regret is a useful and rational tool in deliberation after all.
2. Four Arguments Against the Deliberative Value of (the 
Prospect of) Regret
Philosophers thinking about the deliberative value of regret have come from differ-
ent philosophical sub-disciplines. One of the most well-known discussions on regret 
of recent years has been instigated by R. Jay Wallace’s (2013) book The View from 
Here: On Affirmation, Attachment, and the Limits of Regret in which he takes issue 
with Bernard Williams’ argument from ‘Moral Luck’. As we will explain, Wallace’s 
main, important contribution to discussions on regret is his claim that regret does 
not track justification in the way Williams thought. Another well-known recent 
book that bears on the discussion on regret is Transformative Experience by L. A. 
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Paul (2015a). She approaches the topic from a more general and existentialist angle 
than Wallace, arguing that many decisions in life cannot be made rationally. The 
concept of a transformative experience is much discussed within analytic philoso-
phy, but the implications for the deliberative value of regret have not been drawn out 
in the way we will do here. In addition to these two positions, we will summarize 
arguments formulated by Kate Greasly, a bio-ethicist working on abortion, and 
Bence Nanay, a philosopher of mind studying the processes that underlie imagina-
tion and deliberation. Drawing on their reflections we will identify and describe the 
irrelevance-argument, the manipulation-argument, the inaccessibility-argument 
and the misleading-argument in the rest of this section.
2.1. The Irrelevance-Argument
In The View from Here Wallace argues that regret and justification do not track 
each other in the way that Williams’ argument from ‘Moral Luck’ supposes. 
Central to Williams’ argument is the fictionalized character of the mature 
Gauguin, who looks back at his decision to abandon his family in order to 
travel to Tahiti. His success as a painter makes it impossible for Gauguin to 
regret the decision, and what is more, according to Williams, the success also 
justifies retrospectively the decision he took. Wallace criticizes Williams for 
mixing up two different things: the inability to regret a decision and the deci-
sion being justified. He illustrates the difference with another classic example 
from the philosophical literature: the 14-year-old girl who decides to have a 
child. Originally featuring in Derek Parfit’s (1983, 358) Reasons and Persons, in 
the context of the non-identity problem, Wallace focuses on the discrepancy 
between two things we want to say about this case. On the one hand, the birth 
of the child calls for an attitude of affirmation that makes regret inappropriate. 
On the other hand, there are weighty considerations against the girl’s decision 
to become pregnant, which remain cogent even after the child is born. This is 
also true from the girl’s internal standpoint: after having given birth to a child, 
she is bound to affirm the child’s existence, and thus unable to wish that it had 
not been born. This implies that she cannot regret her decision upon Wallace’s 
(uncontroversial and accepted) understanding of regret as an on balance wish 
that one had not done what one did. As the girl is glad that the child is around 
(i.e. that she gave birth to it), she cannot both wish that the child was there 
and that she had not conceived at that particular point in time. And yet, it 
is psychologically and conceptually possible that, while affirming her child’s 
existence, the girl recognizes that she made a wrong decision.
There is no puzzle here according to Wallace, since the inability to regret an 
earlier occurrence does not amount to retrospective justification or endorse-
ment. The key lies in the phenomenon of attachments. The affirmation receives 
its validity not from reasons for the decision that would somehow, over time, 
be rehabilitated, but rather from the attachments that define the mother’s 
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retrospective point of view and that came about as a result of the supposedly 
ill-conceived decision. The attachment to the child makes the girl immune 
to regret but the reasons of attachment that apply to the mother when she 
looks back are different from the moral and prudential reasons that apply to 
the young girl deliberating about whether to become pregnant. Thus, the dis-
crepancy between the inability to regret and the recognition that the decision 
was wrong makes sense on the view that there is a discrepancy between the 
value in present attachments and the rational justification of past decisions. 
As Wallace writes: 
The basic idea I defend is that the girl had good reason not to become a mother 
when she faced the decision about whether to conceive, but that she later has 
good reason to affirm the decision that she made, insofar as she is now attached 
to the child to whom she gave birth. (2013, 5)
Gauguin’s inability to regret his decision to abandon his family can also be 
explained in terms of attachments: Gauguin enjoyed a meaningful life, and 
became attached to his artistic project. Wallace concedes that attachments may 
make it impossible to regret a decision (to parent a child; to embark on an 
artistic project incompatible with family life), but against Williams he insists 
that the perspectival inability to regret an earlier decision on account of psy-
chological pressures inherent in one’s later point of view does not amount to 
an ex post facto justification.
Applying Wallace’s argument to our two case studies, we should first note 
that Wallace does not focus on the prospect of regret as an aspect of delibera-
tion. Rather, he focuses on regret as a backward-looking emotion. However, we 
think that his argument commits him to saying that the prospect of regret has 
no deliberative use. Since the inability to regret a decision does not justify the 
decision, the prospect of the impossibility to regret a particular choice should 
not be interpreted as evidence that one makes the right choice. The reasons of 
attachment that will be brought about by giving birth to a child, including one 
with Down syndrome, do not apply to the deliberative stance from which one 
needs to make a justified decision. Wallace would say that our suggested heu-
ristic tool yields justification too easily. Since it is psychologically very unlikely 
that one will regret the existence of a child, bringing it into existence would 
be almost always justified if regret and justification would track each other 
like Williams thinks. If proactive affirmation yielded justification, it would 
be far too easy to let oneself off the hook and to stop the deliberation process 
prematurely. Thus, following his analysis of the deliberative situations of the 
14-year-old girl and Gauguin, Wallace considers the prospect of being unable 
to regret a decision to be irrelevant to the justification of that decision, and, 
we suggest, would advise against the use of the heuristic device we described 
in our two case studies.
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2.2. The Manipulation-Argument
Kate Greasly strongly relies on Wallace’s argumentation in her objection against 
the use of regret in deliberations about whether or not to have an abortion. She 
agrees with Wallace that regret over abortion-decisions is often encouraged by 
factors other than the moral justification of the decision or its effect on women’s 
welfare. Going beyond Wallace, she explains regret, if it does occur, by reference 
to social pressure. On her line of thinking, ‘using the possibility or likelihood 
of regret to deter women from abortion is rationally unfounded at best, and at 
worst, emotionally manipulative’ (Greasly 2012, 711).
To corroborate this claim, she cites Prolife Advocates who assert that ‘while 
many women regret having their abortions, few regret having their babies’ 
(quoted by Greasley 2012, 705). Greasly rebuts their argument, first by citing 
numbers that suggest otherwise, and second by giving an explanation of the 
regret that does not bear on the reasons for (not) having an abortion. In other 
words, even if it is true that not having an abortion causes regret less often 
than having one, it does not follow that having an abortion is, overall, less 
justified. It can still be the best option. A far more plausible explanation for the 
asymmetry, according to Greasly, has to take into account the duty to embrace 
motherhood. Regret over motherhood becomes inappropriate once a child is 
born, she thinks, and so a mother has ‘an important reason not to embrace 
that attitude [of regret] emanating from her maternal duties’ (Greasley 2012, 
709). There is no parallel duty for women who terminate their pregnancies: 
‘women who choose to terminate pregnancies are under no such parallel duty 
to celebrate and affirm their decision in retrospect’ (2012, 709). In other words, 
as there are fewer psychological or ethical barriers, in the form of an existing 
child, to adopt an attitude of regret, it is unsurprising that they do adopt it 
more often than the alternative group. However, that there are no such barriers 
for them to feel regret does not imply that they have reason to regret. It only 
explains why it is psychologically more likely that they will feel regret. Note 
that Greasly goes further than Wallace in holding that mothers have a ‘duty to 
celebrate and affirm their decision [to have a child] in retrospect’, while Wallace 
only speaks about the psychological likelihood of a mother affirming her child’s 
existence. Secondly, about the alternative group, the women who chose an 
abortion, Wallace does not say anything. Indeed, his argument is limited to the 
claim that the inability to regret a decision does not justify the decision. He does 
not commit himself explicitly to the reverse claim that regretting a decision 
does not undermine justification for the decision. But it seems tempting and 
reasonable to defend both claims together. For Greasly, the feeling of regret is as 
irrelevant to the justification of a decision as the inability to feel regret. Hence, 
she argues that bringing in the possibility of regret in a deliberation process, is 
not helpful and might even be manipulative. Reminding women of the fact (if 
it is one) that there is a statistically high chance they will regret the abortion 
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later, is misleading since nothing follows from this fact about what would be the 
best choice. It is manipulative insofar as it is used to push women in a direction 
that society, or the person speaking to the women, approves of. What would 
be really helpful is helping women to make an abstraction of what ‘the public 
thinks’ and get in touch with what they themselves want.
2.3. The Inaccessibility-Argument
The notion of a ‘transformative experience’ has received a lot of attention since 
Paul presented it as a challenge to a standard view of rational deliberation. On 
this standard view, a rational agent makes choices by considering the options 
available to her and evaluating each option by assigning it a subjective value, 
based upon a mental model of what the outcome would be like for her/him to 
experience. The problem with this standard view, according to Paul, is that it 
overlooks the transformative nature of certain choices, most notably life choices. 
She explains how life-changing events, like giving birth to a first child or giving 
birth to a child with Down syndrome, are transformative experiences both in 
an epistemic and personal sense. An experience is epistemically transformative 
when it is simply impossible to know what the outcome of the decision will 
be like to experience, without having lived through the experience itself. Life-
changing experiences are also personally transformative, which means that 
one’s future preferences concerning the outcome may change dramatically as 
a result of the experience itself.
To illustrate the double problem with transformative decision-making, Paul 
describes the case of becoming a vampire. How should one decide whether 
one wants to become a vampire, knowing that vampires have entirely different 
experiences to us? One cannot know what it is like to become a vampire until 
actually doing so. And when one undergoes the experience, it will change one’s 
core preferences, which in turn affects how one feels about the decision itself. 
Thus, one cannot possibly imagine, let alone know, what it would be like to be 
a vampire. Nor can one know what one would be missing if one did not. Paul 
(2015b, 764) concludes: ‘So you can’t rationally choose to do it, but nor can you 
rationally choose to avoid it’.
The argument carries over to the real-life example of choosing to have one’s 
first child. Paul considers becoming a parent as a paradigmatic example of a 
transformative experience. As you do not know what it is like to parent a child, 
you cannot possibly assess whether you will appreciate the outcomes of your 
choice. Moreover, the experience of being a parent will alter you so deeply 
that it will alter your personal preferences, and thus the future agent that will 
do the appreciating. Although the prospect of regret does not feature as a sep-
arate deliberative tool in her reasoning, Paul is bound to believe that relying 
on possible future regret makes no sense in our two case studies: one does not 
have the necessary knowledge about what being a parent, or being parent of 
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a child with Down syndrome, is like, nor does one know whether one will be 
a person that regrets the decision after having taken it. For Paul, there are no 
rational or emotional grounds on which to base a choice that will result in a 
transformative experience. Paul advises to look at life as a matter of discovery, 
rather than a rationally executed plan. Pondering over potential regret is useless 
at best, as future regret over life-changing decisions is unimaginable, the future 
being inaccessible.1
2.4. The Misleading-Argument
Bence Nanay acknowledges that people do rely on their imagination in deci-
sion-making processes. Hence, he could concede that imagining whether one 
would regret something is indeed a heuristic that people use. However, he also 
states that this almost never yields optimal results, as imagination is extremely 
sensitive to irrelevant influences, and hence is an unreliable guide for deci-
sion-making. In his paper ‘The Role of Imagination in Decision-Making’ he cites 
psychological studies documenting order effect, framing effects, environmental 
effects like the dirtiness of one’s hands and similar effects on decision-making 
(Nanay 2016, 130). Nanay argues that idealized-deliberation models (like the 
belief–desire model) cannot explain these empirical findings because they do 
not reflect how people actually deliberate. In real life, people do not compare the 
probability of the satisfaction of a desire given one’s background beliefs. Instead, 
when making decisions about the future, they use their imagination. Nanay 
distinguishes three distinct roles imagination plays in the decision-making 
process: ‘you imagine the person you imagine yourself to be in a situation you 
imagine to be the outcome of your decision’. After analysing how imagination 
in deliberation works, he states: ‘As none of these three episodes of imagination 
can be considered reliable, decision-making is extremely unlikely to yield the 
optimal outcome reliably’ (2016, 135, 136).
Nanay seems to take it as a given that decision-making rarely yields the 
optimal outcome. His project is to develop a decision-making model that is 
able to explain this fact (if it is one). He confidently writes:
It is important to emphasize that I am not claiming that we never make optimal 
decisions. We very often do, especially when it is about some decision-problem 
that concerns the near future, or one we encounter often – for example, where 
to go to get a decent cup of coffee in the neighborhood. But we have no reason 
to think that our decisions in general, and especially decisions that really matter 
to us, have much of a chance at yielding the optimal outcome. (Nanay 2016, 
136–137)
He does not conceptualize the notion of an optimal outcome or describe his 
notion of a rational decision. He invokes psychological findings that illus-
trate the sensitivity of imagination to factors that are irrelevant with regard 
to the facts one has to decide about, and he infers that, given our reliance on 
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imagination, decision-making processes are unlikely to yield the optimal out-
come. Thus, imagining whether one will regret motherhood, or parenting a 
child with Down syndrome, must be discarded by Nanay as a misleading tool 
in the search for a rational decision – despite the fact that people actually will 
use it, and despite the fact that Nanay does not mention a realistic alternative 
decision strategy.
3. Against the Arguments Against the Deliberative Value of 
Regret
Having summarized four objections against the use of (the prospect of) regret 
in deliberation, we will now evaluate them. Specifically, we shall challenge their 
dismissal of regret, but acknowledge their value in drawing attention to certain 
pitfalls concerning the deliberative use of regret.
3.1. Against the Irrelevance-Argument
According to Wallace’s distinction between the inability to regret a decision and 
the decision being justified, the prospect of being unable to regret a decision is 
not a good reason to make it. Wallace is right that psychological phenomena 
(about what someone regrets or does not regret) have no justificatory force in 
themselves, but we believe that psychological phenomena may reveal justify-
ing facts. Being unable to regret a choice points towards a reason or value that 
provides the real normative support for a choice. In the same way, the prospect 
of (the absence of) regret does not in itself suffice to justify a decision, but this 
prospect may reveal reasons that, in their turn, do justify the decision. Both the 
case of the teenage mother and of Gauguin can be interpreted along these lines, 
whereby we do not need to conflate psychological constraints with justificatory 
bounds but rather interpret psychology as a marker of justificatory facts. Let 
us first give our alternative interpretation of the Gauguin case before turning 
to the teenage mother, which is closer to our own two case studies.
On Wallace’s reading, Williams starts from Gauguin’s psychological inability 
to regret his earlier decision and reasons that thereby the decision acquires ret-
rospective justification. His interpretation strongly relies on Williams’ (1981, 
36) claim that, ‘his [Gauguin’s] decision was justified, for him, by his success’. 
Wallace resists a more charitable reading, according to which Williams does 
not derive normative conclusions from psychological premises. On our reading 
of Williams’ argument, what justifies Gauguin’s decision is not the ex post facto 
inability to regret, but rather Gauguin’s ground project to become a successful, 
accomplished artist. Only time could tell whether this ground project would 
be realized and could carry the normative weight it was supposed to carry. 
Gauguin would not have been able to affirm his life and the necessary historical 
conditions such as the decision to leave Paris and decamp for Tahiti, if it turned 
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out that he was unable to produce innovative, high-value art works. In that case 
‘the project which generated the decision is revealed as an empty thing, inca-
pable of grounding the agent’s life’ (Williams 1981, 36). When he succeeds, the 
decision is, in a sense, justified retrospectively. But the important thought here 
is that, for Williams, only from the retrospective point of view does it become 
clear that the decision to leave for Tahiti was justified, which means: backed up 
by real reasons – not apparent reasons.2 We don’t think that Williams meant to 
say, nor would we want to endorse it if he did mean this, that the immunity to 
regret was in itself the justifying ground of Gauguin’s cruel decision.
The next lengthy quote from The View from Here enables us to show what 
Wallace overlooks in the case of the teenage mother. He writes:
Even before giving birth to her daughter, the young girl had good reason to 
expect that both she and her child would have powerful grounds for affirming 
retrospectively a decision she might make to become pregnant. The fact that this 
outcome could be anticipated in advance, however, hardly suffices to undermine 
the weighty moral and prudential objections to having a child at that stage of life. 
It is not the kind of consideration that is capable of playing this role, and so we 
are not even tempted to think that the presence of these factors affects the truth 
of claims about what the young girl ought to have done. (Wallace 2013, 106)
However, this is not an accurate or fair description of the girl’s deliberative 
situation. It is not the prospect of retrospective affirmation that in itself moti-
vates the girl to become pregnant. Rather, it is the expectance that a meaningful 
relationship with someone will arise, an attachment that, as an unintended 
consequence, will also ground retrospective affirmation. As we conceded in 
the Gauguin case, immunity to regret does not directly yield a retrospective 
justification. Likewise, the prospect of justifiable immunity to regret does not 
in itself change an agent’s deliberative situation. But the focus on the attitudes 
of regret and affirmation diverts the attention from the grounds for regret and 
affirmation in the case of the teenage mother, namely attachments. And it seems 
to us that the prospect of a meaningful attachment, or the deep human desire to 
create such attachments, might very well be a justifying reason for doing what 
it takes to sustain or create these attachments. Accordingly, in our alternative 
reading of the deliberating teenage mother, reflection on the possibility of regret 
does have deliberative value because it can help her become aware of (possibly 
conflicting) deep desires. When you sincerely think that you will be unable to 
regret motherhood (under the right circumstances, such as after freeing oneself 
of social pressure, as we will explain below), this reveals a value that matters 
deeply to you. In that sense, the prospect of regret can matter deliberatively, 
precisely because the prospect of attachment or another valuable experience 
which will make it impossible to regret the decision, can be a reason feeding 
into the deliberation.
Wallace recognizes the importance of having meaningful attachments in 
life, but in his book he limits the normative weight of them to the retrospective 
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point of view. However, the prospect of a valuable attachment can perfectly well 
count as a reason in favour of a decision that will bring the attachment about. 
In fact, that seems to be exactly the reason for many people to have children: 
they look forward to experiencing the special relationship that they will have 
with their children. We should note here that people have many, sometimes 
conflicting, deep desires. The prospect that one will be unable to regret parent-
hood should, therefore, not be thought of as the only decisive factor. We think 
it is perfectly possible to acknowledge that you probably will be unable to regret 
motherhood, and still decide to not have a child at that moment in your life, or 
ever (because you also long for other things in life that are incompatible with 
parenthood and which you think you would regret missing out on). But we do 
think that a deliberative process that takes into account the possibility of future 
regret, and the lesson it can teach the decision-maker about her own values, is 
more informed than one that does not take into account future emotions. If we 
are right in thinking that Wallace’s account of the irrelevance of (the absence 
of) retrospective regret with regard to the justification of decision also implies 
that the prospect of regret as a decision-making tool is irrelevant, we suggest 
that he is wrong: discarding the attitude of regret as normatively irrelevant is 
not entirely justified.
Summing up, we grant Wallace that the prospect of being unable to regret a 
decision is not in itself a good reason in favour of the decision just as the wish 
to avoid the unpleasant feeling of regret is not in itself a good reason to avoid 
doing something. However, it is important to regard regret as a second-order 
phenomenon supervening on a reason against a particular course of action. 
Thus, when people justify their decision by saying they will regret it if they 
do not do it (or the other way around), they refer to regret as a shorthand for 
an underlying reason that counts in favour of the decision and that would be 
frustrated if the action remains undone. In this capacity, regret and the prospect 
of regret play a truly informative role in deliberation, insofar as it can reveal or 
disclose relevant reasons or values relevant for the decision under deliberation.
3.2. Against the Manipulation-Argument
Greasly draws attention to a causal factor in the generation of regret that is not 
mentioned by Wallace and that needs to be ruled out before we can call regret a 
useful deliberative tool, namely social pressure. Like all our emotions, regret is 
subject to influencing factors like peer-pressure or social-norm-internalization. 
However, insofar as the undeniably malleable nature of emotions in general 
does not justify a complete disregard of all emotions, we have no reason to be 
so radical in our treatment of regret. We have reason to be cautious, and to try 
to distinguish between improper and authentic feelings of regret. No doubt, this 
is difficult in practice, but in theory it is clear that there is no alternative besides 
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assessing, developing and training our emotions such that they correspond with 
the reasons that we endorse and the values that we commit to.
When it comes to regret, one of the things that we need to be wary of are 
social norms imposed by stereotypes and expectations that we might not 
endorse if they were made explicit. The case of parenthood is a clear case at 
hand: childless women have to justify themselves (or at least offer an expla-
nation) far more often than childless men. Hence, it should not be a surprise 
that women will feel guilty or regretful more often than men do when they 
remain childless. Indeed, research shows that pro-natalism, the belief that 
bearing children should be promoted, has negative effects on voluntarily and 
non-voluntarily childfree adults, especially women (see for example Park 2002; 
Mumtaz, Shahid, and Levay 2013). Conversely, it also means that mothers may 
be more prone to feelings of regret than fathers will be once they realize that 
they were attracted to motherhood by inauthentic factors. Greasly is, therefore, 
surely right to draw our attention to social pressure as something that may 
undermine the deliberative value of feelings of regret. Yet we think she is too 
radical in being suspicious of the deliberative value of regret overall. Moreover, 
she herself inadvertently reinforces a social norm that contributes to improper 
feelings of regret and guilt in women. Greasly endorses a manipulative stere-
otype herself by taking it for granted that mothers are unable to regret moth-
erhood. She speaks about ‘the inability to regret choosing motherhood’ (2012, 
711), as well as about ‘the duty to celebrate and affirm the decision [to become 
a mother] in retrospect’ (2012, 709). Both the psychological and moral claims 
are questionable. In fact, we think that it is both psychologically possible and 
morally permissible to regret motherhood (which is different from regretting 
that your child exists).
That it is psychologically possible to regret motherhood is an empirical fact. 
That it is morally permissible needs to be argued for, which we will not do 
here.3 We simply want to point out that it should not be taken for granted 
that embracing motherhood is something that morality imposes on us. The 
empirical fact is established by testimonies of mothers who say that they regret 
becoming a mother. A recent study by the sociologist Orna Donath (2015) 
has studied maternal regret in 23 Israeli women and there have been mothers 
in Germany and the UK who have voiced their wish that they had remained 
childless.4Reading these testimonies, it is important to distinguish between 
two kinds of regret. The mothers all insist that they love their children. Their 
emotional life thus presupposes a difference between regretting that one’s child 
exists and regretting that one has become a parent. Admittedly, the first may be 
psychologically impossible, and perhaps morally objectionable – although one 
can imagine extreme cases of serial killers or dictators whose parents are utterly 
appalled by the immoral character of the creature they put on this world. But 
overall, regretting the existence of a living individual seems a morally prob-
lematic attitude, especially if it is one’s own responsibility that this individual 
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exists. However, the object of the second type of regret is not someone else’s 
existence but the quality of one’s own life. It does not seem morally wrong, nor 
uncommon, and certainly not psychologically impossible for people to regret 
what their lives have become. People make life choices that they might regret 
afterwards, and parenthood may be one of these choices.
As the possibility that one will regret motherhood is real, it can be helpful to 
think about the prospect of regret while deliberating about having a child. Greasly 
thinks of contexts in which the likelihood of regret is used manipulatively, by people 
who assert that one will regret it. But that is not the way in which our caring friend 
from the first case study, wanting to help her friend make a decision, invokes the 
possibility of regret. Does her suggestion to consider the possibility of regret need 
to be interpreted as manipulative? It seems to us that it need not, if the two choices 
are presented as equally worthy.5 Orna Donath’s study may be seen as a reminder 
of what happens when regret is invoked as a manipulative tool. The context of her 
study is important: in a pro-natalist society (as exemplified in a traditional Jewish 
community) it is expected that women will regret not becoming a mother. The 
study highlights powerfully that the use of regret as a heuristic tool in deciding 
whether to have a child should be non-coercive. The question whether one would 
regret not becoming a mother is only useful as a way to investigate one’s own values 
if it is asked in a neutral way, as an invitation for further reflection.
Raising the possibility of regret, either proactively or retrospectively seems 
to cause suspicion in many cases: in Greasly’s interpretation it can be seen as 
a suspect way of manipulating women into certain roles. A similar feeling is 
expressed in the reason why France’s Conseil d’État (State Council) banned the 
‘Dear Future Mom’ video from airing on French television.6 We agree that the 
video is manipulative in that its explicit meaning is to encourage women (only 
future mothers are addressed, not fathers, which is another problem with the 
video) not to abort a foetus with trisomy-21. However, the context and back-
ground of this video is of course very specific: it is invoked by an increasingly 
common practice and social expectation that women will not give birth to a 
baby that was prenatally diagnosed with Down syndrome. The makers of the 
video wanted to fight one manipulative practice with another. Whether that is 
a prudent or wise strategy is something we will not discuss here. What we do 
want to draw attention to is the remarkable explanation of the ban by France’s 
Conseil d’État in terms of concerns that the showing of happy children with 
Down syndrome in the video was ‘inappropriate’ because they were ‘likely to 
disturb the conscience of women who had lawfully made different personal life 
choices’.7 There are two readings of this statement: either the council thinks that 
women who regret the abortion later made a wrong choice, in which case it 
seem strange that one would want to spare these women the realization that they 
made a wrong choice – they are rational adults after all. Or the council thinks 
that regret invoked by the video does not reflect a wrong choice and should 
therefore be avoided. But why precisely are feelings of regret so bad that a state 
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must intervene to prevent citizens from having them? The answer is especially 
difficult when we assume that the regret does not reveal an unjustified choice. 
One can regret something while still (correctly) believing that one did, overall, 
the right thing. The message of the Conseil d’État seems to be that not only 
should people not use regret to inform decisions, but also that once the decisions 
are taken, it is imperative that any feelings of regret regarding them should be 
avoided as much as possible. This fear of regret seems unreasonable to us, and 
based on a false, one-sided idea of regret (perhaps emotions in general) as unre-
liable and manipulative while they very often, under the right circumstances, 
convey important information about what matters to us.
Summing up, we argue that, while a reference to regret may be used in a 
manipulative way, asking (oneself or someone else) whether one would regret 
a decision can very well be an honest invitation to reflect on one’s values and 
expectations. In relation to our two case studies, it is important to keep in mind 
that regret over motherhood or parenthood is a real possibility, the prospect of 
which should at least inform one’s decision.
3.3. Against the Inaccessibility-Argument
In her book Transformative Experience, Paul uses the examples of choosing 
to become a parent and choosing to become a vampire to demonstrate that 
it is impossible to rationally choose the right action on the basis of current 
knowledge or preferences. But are becoming a parent and becoming a vampire 
really on a par? Are they equally transformative in both the epistemic and per-
sonal sense? A transformative experience is personally transformative in that it 
changes one’s core preferences. This might be true of becoming a vampire. But 
it is not obvious that becoming a parent also necessarily or always changes one’s 
personality in a radical sense. It may be that becoming a parent reveals certain 
aspects of one’s personality that were already there, or it resonates with known 
and unknown deep, core preferences that one has always had. Using heuristic 
tools such as pondering over the possibility of regret may reveal some of these 
characteristics. We will come back to the deliberative problem posed by per-
sonal transformation, but first we will examine whether epistemic transforma-
tion is really an obstacle to rational decision-making in the way Paul thinks it is.
Even if we grant that becoming a parent involves an epistemic transfor-
mation, one can wonder what it is exactly that one cannot know in advance. 
For example, Elizabeth Harman (2015) has argued, contra Paul, that one can 
approach the experience of parenthood by listening to or reading other peo-
ple’s testimonies about it. That does not tell you how it will be for you ‘from 
the inside’, but there are very few instances where we have that information. 
To some extent, you cannot know what something (anything!) will be like for 
you at time t1, until it happens to you at time t1. Admittedly, the likelihood that 
you know what drinking the next cup of tea will be like is higher than that you 
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know what becoming a parent is like, because in the former case you can fall 
back on ample personal experience. And so, admittedly, the decision whether 
to have children or not may be sufficiently different from other decisions one 
has to make, and so unique and personal, that standard decision-making heu-
ristics are more difficult to apply. However, that does not make these heuristics 
inapplicable or entirely useless.
Nevertheless, someone might argue that the decision to have a child is so 
unlike any other decision that one has made that it is a sui generis decision, 
and that the deliberation proceeding this decision is therefore also sui generis 
and in no way comparable to standard decision-making processes.8 Although 
we agree that the decision to have a child is an existential choice, whereas 
drinking a cup of tea is not, the differences between kinds of decisions seem 
gradual rather than categorical to us. Moreover, where we place a decision on 
the spectrum might differ between individuals. Imagine a woman who has 
been voluntarily helping her elder sister raising her nephews and nieces all her 
adolescent life. For her the decision to have children of her own might come 
naturally. Of course, she will realize it is a life-changing decision, and therefore 
different from having a cup of tea, but it is quite imaginable that she will not 
experience it as a particularly difficult or exceptional decision. Why would she? 
She has plenty of quasi-personal experience with what it is like to have children, 
she has no conflicting desires, and she knows what she wants. When someone 
asks her whether she might regret motherhood, she reflects on the question 
and in all honesty answers ‘no’. She can apply the same heuristic devices as she 
would use in general, and although she most probably will see a difference in 
importance between the decision to have children and the decision to drink 
tea, she might not single out the former decision as exceptionally difficult or 
therefore exceptionally different from other decisions she made. The decision to 
go to university as the first woman in her family, might be far more sui generis 
to her than the decision to become a mother! For other people, in different 
circumstances, it would be the other way around. The relevant question for us 
is whether the sui generis character of a decision implies anything about the 
heuristic methods that can be used. We think that even for the woman being 
the first of her family to go to university, the question about future regret is 
useful, even if it only served the purpose of strengthening her resolution to go 
for it. This last point connects to a different worry we have with Paul’s account 
and that has to do with what Paul thinks deliberation is about.
For Paul, deliberation is about assigning value to alternative choices based 
upon what one imagines future experience to be like. But in deciding which 
choice to make, future experiences may not always be what matters. Maybe 
making an informed choice is not solely about what the future brings for you, 
but is also about what kind of person you want to be, or, when a pregnancy 
is involved, what you think will be good for the child. In a commentary on 
Paul’s book, John Campbell rightly questions Paul’s way of framing the decision 
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whether or not to have a child as a decision that must be based on the subjective 
values of the experiences stemming from the choice. Paul’s central argument is 
that it is impossible to know these subjective experiences, and therefore impos-
sible to rationally decide in these matters anyway. But Campbell wonders why 
she works with this decision model to start with. He contrasts it with something 
a friend of his said about the decision to have children: ‘I want to have children 
because my life has always been entirely centered on me, and I want to be forced 
to live in a different way’ (Campbell 2015, 791). For this person, the decision 
to have a child was not based on the expected value of future experiences (and 
could hence not fail on the basis of ignorance about these experiences). Rather 
the decision was based on reflection about her identity, and about the things 
she was committed to or wanted to be committed to. Paul has replied to this 
criticism, but unconvincingly in our eyes.9 She cannot deny that she regards 
reflection about one’s future subjective life as basic to any rational deliberation 
strategy. This account of rational decision-making is presupposed by her the-
ory about the doubly challenging nature of transformative decision-making. 
It is this foundational assumption that we, like Campbell, want to question. 
Our suggestion that reflection on regret has deliberative value may seem in 
line with Paul’s focus on subjective experiences but in fact it is not. As we 
explained before, we consider the subjective state of regret to be a second-order 
phenomenon, supervening on facts and values and concerns that bear the real 
normative weight. We can be pluralists about reasons, and allow for both sub-
jective experiences and objective evaluative facts as reasons being revealed by 
the feeling of regret. Deliberation on this picture is not about imagining what 
future experiences will be like but about deciding what kind of person one is 
or wants to be. Now, Paul might object that imagining feelings of regret can 
only track current preferences, values or conceptions of oneself. That is exactly 
the deliberative problem, she thinks, posed by personal transformation. If one’s 
evaluative framework will be altered by the experience itself, it is irrelevant, 
she presumably would argue, that based on one’s current evaluative framework 
one would regret a choice. But here we might pause and wonder what should 
guide and justify a decision: future experiences (which, admittedly, are hard or 
impossible to predict) or current preferences and value judgments? Although 
one cannot know whether one will or will not regret a decision, reflecting on 
whether one might regret it can help to reveal current values and preferences, 
and insofar as these should guide and justify decisions, imagining regret can 
help agents to understand what to do. Whether personal transformation hinders 
deliberation depends on what one thinks deliberation should be guided by. It 
seems very plausible to us that in particular important decisions and existential 
choices are decided by reflection about what kind of person one is, what kind 
of life one finds valuable, rather than by imagining how one would experience 
the future. Hence, we can save the heuristic value of regret from the problem 
posed by personal transformation.
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That the future is inaccessible is a trivial truth and does not undermine 
(but rather is the raison d’être of) the usefulness of all deliberation processes. 
Presumably, Paul would agree with that. Yet she questions the use of imagina-
tion in deliberation on the basis of the transformative nature of the decision 
to be taken. We read her scepticism as emanating from either an unrealistic 
expectation of what deliberation is capable of or an exaggerated view of how 
different a person’s future self may be. The message that we do take from Paul’s 
concerns is that imagination is only useful insofar as it is informed. Imagining 
that one will regret motherhood or the absence of motherhood, while having 
a one-sided, naïve or idealized view of what motherhood involves, cannot pos-
sibly have deliberative value. For imagining whether one will regret something 
to be a useful heuristic tool, one must be informed about the circumstances 
one is imagining. Only when it is informed, the prospect of regret may reveal 
an authentic aspect of one’s evaluative outlook.
3.4. Against the Misleading-Argument
As already transpires from our analysis of Paul’s argument, at the background 
of this discussion are conflicting views about what deliberation is and what it 
can be expected to do. Our disagreement with Nanay’s argument also reveals 
a different view of deliberation and rational decision-making. While Nanay 
does not lay out a full theory, he does equate rational decision-making with 
latching onto optimal outcomes. As our imagination can lead us away from, 
instead of towards, what is objectively speaking the optimal outcome, Nanay 
concludes that the use of imagination, such as imagining future regret, is not 
a rational way of making decisions. But is decision-making really a matter of 
latching onto optimal results? Is deliberation (say, about becoming a parent or 
about giving birth to a child with special needs) merely a process of discovering 
a fact that is established independently of the process of deliberation that one 
is going through? This view depicts deliberation as an exercise in detective-like 
discovery work, rather than in making up one’s mind. Taken to its extreme, the 
view suggests that when a woman says, about whether or not to try to become 
pregnant, that she does not know what she wants, she means that there is some 
strong preference inside her but she cannot find it. This discovery-model of 
deliberation seems implausible to us. Much more likely is the interpretation that 
the woman in our example does not know what she wants in the sense that she 
cannot make up her mind. Indeed, we believe that making the right decision is 
not about latching onto the optimal outcome but about going through a pro-
cess. Through deliberation, the right decision is formed rather than discovered. 
Imagining potential regret is part of this process, as it can shed light on one’s 
values and expectations.
Another difference between the discovery-model and the formation-model 
of deliberation is the privileged standpoint of the first-person-deliberator. 
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Finding out what is objectively speaking the best result is a process that can in 
principle be undertaken by anyone who has epistemic access to the relevant 
information. But making up one’s mind is something that can only be done 
first-personally. When the friend in our first case study asks what the woman 
would regret, it is important that the woman herself answers this question, no 
matter how well the friend knows her. Deliberating and deciding what course 
of action one will take is a matter of owning up to one’s values and concerns, 
and of committing oneself to a particular turn the future will take.10 Decisions, 
in other words, are not only end products but also starting points. Decisions 
are commitments, and as such they change the future. In our opinion it is quite 
possible that a pregnant woman who, after honest reflection on her values and 
expectations in life, decides to interrupt a pregnancy will not look back with 
regret while the same woman in a counterfactual situation where she goes along 
with the doctor’s subtle (or not so subtle) recommendation does struggle with 
feelings of regret afterwards. The objective facts, about her desires and values 
and expectations and living conditions and such like, may be exactly the same, 
but her taking a stance one way or another makes all the difference. The point 
of deliberation is not to find out the best outcome but to make up one’s mind. 
On this picture, the degree to which a decision is rational is more a function of 
the authenticity and self-knowledge with which a commitment is made than 
an objective or neutral assessment of the resulting outcome.
Summing up, the prospect of regret is not a misleading influence on deliber-
ation if deliberation is thought of as a matter of owning up to one’s own values 
and committing oneself to a course of action. Since regret (under the right 
circumstances) is an indication that one values something, imagining whether 
one will regret a decision is a way to get closer to what one values. It is unclear to 
what extent framing effects, order effects, circumstantial effects would prevent 
someone from being able to decide what he cares about.
4. How to Understand the Deliberative Value of (the Prospect of) 
Regret
While we are critical of the above objections against the deliberative use of regret, 
important lessons can be gleaned from them. For the prospect of regret to have 
real deliberative value, it should be arrived at (1) via reflection on one’s values, (2) 
non-coercively, (3) when well-informed about factual circumstances and (4) in 
a process of self-commitment. Each of these four conditions is meant to capture 
a fair point of criticism revealed in the objections above. Let us recapitulate.
Against the irrelevance-argument, we hold that regret and the prospect 
of regret are relevant to deliberation if regret is understood as a second-or-
der phenomenon that reveals underlying normative facts. Thus, the question 
whether one will regret something is a useful deliberative heuristic only if it is 
approached as a means to better understand one’s values and concerns.
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Against the manipulation-argument, we argued that the question ‘Do you 
think you will regret (not) making this decision later?’ need not be manipulative 
if it springs from the honest belief that the alternatives are equally valid, and 
that hence regret about either alternative would be possible and legitimate. 
This condition is not fulfilled when a ProLife Advocate tells a woman that she 
will probably regret one choice but not the other. He thereby does not help the 
woman to make up her own mind, but manipulates her in a certain direction. 
Reflection on the possibility of regret has deliberative value only if it is under-
taken in a non-coercive context.
The inaccessibility-argument presupposes a rather demanding view of 
rational deliberation, which we are sceptical of. It may be true that choices can 
never be completely informed, but that does not mean no meaningful distinc-
tion can be made between rational and irrational or between well-informed and 
rash decisions. The question whether one will come to regret a certain decision 
might invite a certain amount of speculation (as the future is indeed inaccessible 
to us), but not more so than every other deliberative situation where all one 
has to go on are testimonies by other people and neutral information about 
objective facts. To enhance the deliberative usefulness of reflection on regret, 
we should indeed inform ourselves as best as we can. This information increases 
the chance that we have a realistic image of what future experiences will be like. 
But in the end, these experiences are not what matters, normatively speaking. 
What matters is what imagining them reveals to us. By imagining ourselves in 
the future situation, we use our emotional resources to get information about 
what we care about and what would be reasonable for us to do, given all the 
available information. The use of emotions in deliberation has been proven to 
be helpful, and even in some cases preferable to a calculating, logical approach 
to deliberations.11 Like all other emotions, regret, if assessed and interpreted 
wisely, informs us about what we care about, and is in that sense an important 
heuristic device in deliberation.
The mentioned psychological studies that encourage us to rely on our gut 
instincts also speak against the misleading-argument. But as the empirical find-
ings on the use of System 1 are mixed (see footnote 11), we rest our argument 
on a conceptual point: whether the use of imagination (and emotion, for that 
matter) misleads an agent depends on what one believes rational deliberation 
should lead to. Of course, we want rational deliberation to lead to a rational 
outcome, but whether it can be established what this outcome is without involv-
ing the agent’s own reasoning towards a decision is an open question. We find 
the formation-model of deliberation more plausible than the discovery-model, 
and hence interpret reflection on the likelihood of regret as a useful means to 
make up one’s mind about what to do.
If these four conditions are fulfilled, then the question ‘will you regret it?’ 
does not have to be interpreted as a manipulative trick to guide you in a certain 
direction, or an unreliable, misleading and possibly useless distraction. Even 
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if the conditions are fulfilled, it is still essential to interpret the role of regret in 
deliberation correctly. Thinking about regret is not a direct shortcut to a right 
decision. ‘Will you regret it?’ should be interpreted more as an encouragement 
to think about what matters most to you in life. Indeed, the values that reveal 
themselves in that reflective process are the actual and proper sources of reasons 
for action. As such, it is a heuristic device to help you decide what you care 
about, to endorse and compare values and to commit to a certain kind of life. 
But people care about many, sometimes incompatible things. Therefore, we also 
believe that it is perfectly possible to acknowledge that you will regret (certain 
aspects of) a decision, like aborting a foetus with a disability or becoming a par-
ent at a young age, but still make that decision. Acknowledging the possibility of 
regret is an integral part of the decision process. As such, the prospect of regret 
does not offer decisive reason against a decision. Yet, it is still informative. For 
example, in the case of the decision to abort a foetus with a disability, pondering 
over whether you would regret this decision may make you realize that you 
do not have enough information to answer this question. Although, as Paul 
would argue, it is impossible to know for certain what it would be like to raise 
a child with a disability, reflecting on regret may be an impetus to try to seek 
further information and try to answer that question as accurately as possible. 
Moreover, it is useful to realize in advance: I might regret this decision, but 
that only means that pain is a part of life, not that my decision was a mistake.
In this respect, we find the description of agent regret by Carla Bagnoli 
(2000) useful. For her, agent regret is not just an unfortunate fact of life, but 
an important practical capacity. Regret should be interpreted as an acknowl-
edgement that one did not choose a valuable alternative, and thus as a mode 
of valuing. This appreciation of paths not taken is the result of practical rea-
soning: of reconstructing one’s past by reviewing one’s reasons and realizing 
the constraints that bear on one’s choices (either due to mistakes or to limiting 
circumstances). By analogy, we state that the prospect of regret is a sign of 
valuing, and of discovering one’s values, and as such is a valuable part of a 
deliberative process.
5. Conclusion
Can the prospect of regret be informative when making certain life-changing 
decisions, such as deciding whether to continue a pregnancy of a child with a 
disability or whether to become a parent? We have argued, starting from the 
assumption that such decisions are best answered by personal deliberation 
rather than by applying certain abstract principles, that indeed, a non-coercive 
reflection on the possibility of regretting a decision is a useful component in 
a deliberative process. There are certain conditions that need to be fulfilled, 
though. First, it should be an instance of informed regret, not a preference 
based on ignorance. Also, the invitation to think about the likelihood of regret 
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should be seen as an invitation to think about one’s values and preferences, 
one’s wishes and expectations: who am I and who do I want to be? And perhaps 
most importantly, the reflection should be free from improper influences on 
regret, such as social pressure. If these conditions are fulfilled, and the process 
of making up one’s mind is set in motion, then reflection on the question of 
what one will regret may be a helpful heuristic device to get in touch with one’s 
deepest concerns that give reasons to act in a particular way. The common 
practice of asking ourselves or each other whether we would regret a certain 
decision survives the philosophical objections to doing so.
Notes
1.  In later writings on the role of imaginative empathy in deliberation, Paul even 
goes further and suggests that it is not only impossible (and hence useless 
to try) to imagine what it would be like to have a child (or undergo another 
transformative experience) but also that it would be alienating and corrupting to 
try to imagine this while going through the deliberation process. It can be very 
rational not to want to engage in imaginative empathy, Paul thinks, because the 
imaginative act may change you and alienate you from your current preferences. 
Thus the epistemic device of imaginative empathy can turn into a personal 
change before one decided what one wants. On this line of thinking, Paul would 
explicitly advise our two women in the case studies not to imagine whether 
they would regret a choice in five years’ time because the imaginative act may 
have a corruptive, alienating effect and be detrimental to the decision-making.
2.  Williams is careful not to say that the retrospective affirmation makes the 
decision morally justified. Gauguin only achieves rational justification for his 
decision. (In light of this, one might find the notion moral luck a bit misleading. 
What depends on fortune for Gauguin, is not whether his decision will be 
morally justified. In fact, we think that Williams would agree that Gauguin’s 
decision remains a cruel one and is an immoral decision, even if it was justified 
overall. Gauguin is subject to justification luck only.)
3.  See, however, Protasi (forthcoming).
4.  See, for example, this article in The Guardian: Marsh  2017.
5.  Of course, this begs the question whether a more persuasive suggestion to at least 
consider regret is ever allowed. For example, if we talk to Parfit’s 14-year-old girl 
who desperately wants to become a mother as soon as possible, is our ‘would 
you not regret becoming a mother so early on (and foregoing an education 
for example)?’ an honest invitation for reflection on her values or an attempt 
at manipulation? There is a fine line. But even in the case of this girl whose 
reflexive autonomy might not be fully developed yet, one stands a better chance 
of having a helpful conversation if one is honest without secret manipulation.
6.  One can watch the video online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ju-
q4OnBtNU
7.  One can find the Counsel’s statements quoted on many websites, tellingly almost 
all conservative news websites or card-carrying ProLife websites. It is a sign of 
our time that this debate is not taken up in mainstream media. See for example 
LifeNews.com: Metaxas and Rivera 2017.
8.  We thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point.
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9.  In her reply to Campbell, Paul (2015c) points out that she never intended 
subjective values to be understood in an internalist or phenomenological sense. 
She concedes that ‘the subjective value of a lived experience is not merely a 
matter of the phenomenal character of the internal characteristics of one’s inner 
life [and that] it encompasses the value of what it’s like to live in a particular 
set of circumstances, where those circumstances may include the external 
environment’ (2015c, 807) but repeats that nevertheless imagination is needed 
to grasp the subjective value of a possible future experience.
10.  We are indebted to Richard Moran’s (2001) defence of the avowal-theory of 
self-knowledge against the introspective model.
11.  There is a lively debate in psychology on the usefulness of two systems in the 
mind, the ‘quick and dirty’ System 1 and the slower, deliberative System 2. One 
study that provides evidence that in some circumstances relying on our gut 
instinct is a better way to make rational decisions is Dijksterhuis 2006.
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